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Old Rules and New Realities:  Corporate Tax Policy in a Global Setting 
 





This paper reassesses the burden of the current U.S. international tax regime and 
reconsiders well-known welfare benchmarks used to guide international tax reform.  
Reinventing corporate tax policy requires that international considerations be placed front 
and center in the debate on how to tax corporate income.  A simple framework for 
assessing current rules suggests a U.S. tax burden on foreign income in the neighborhood 
of $50 billion a year.  This sizeable U.S. taxation of foreign investment income is 
inconsistent with promoting efficient ownership of capital assets, either from a national or a 
global perspective.  Consequently, there are large potential welfare gains available from 
reducing the U.S. taxation of foreign income, a direction of reform that requires 




I.  Introduction 
Markets and economies evolve continuously, making yesterday’s tax solutions 
possibly much less efficient or desirable today.  Time also brings changes in our 
understanding of the impact, and wisdom, of different tax choices, again carrying the message 
that what might have seemed to work for yesterday may not be sensible today.  A rapidly 
integrating world and a wave of recent scholarship on multinational firms combine to suggest 
that the mismatch between yesterday’s tax policy and today’s reality is particularly 
pronounced with respect to international taxation. 
The rising economic importance of international transactions has put increasing 
pressure on corporate tax systems to accommodate foreign considerations.  This 
accommodation has not been an easy or simple process.  In many countries, particularly high-
income countries such as the United States, corporate tax provisions are designed on the basis 
of domestic considerations.  Subsequently, modifications intended to address problems and 
opportunities that arise due to global capital and goods markets are incorporated, often as 
afterthoughts.  While such a method of policy development has the potential to arrive at 
sensible outcomes, doing so requires greater degrees of luck and patience than most would 
care to attribute to existing political systems. 
Several recent developments have contributed to a growing sense of unease over the 
structure of U.S. corporate taxation, particularly its international provisions, and have 
prompted calls for reform.  The European Union successfully challenged export subsidies 
embedded in the U.S. corporate income tax, leading the World Trade Organization to 
authorize tariffs on American exports.  Reported cases of corporate malfeasance and the 
aggressive use of tax shelters have drawn attention to the tax avoidance activities of many 
corporations, with particular attention on the role of tax havens.  The difficulty of spurring 
investment through traditional channels has frustrated policymakers intent on reversing the 
large loss in manufacturing jobs in the early 2000s.  These events have each contributed to an 
increasing dissatisfaction with the structure of corporate taxation, and at the same time reflect 
the insufficiency of evaluating corporate taxes on the basis of strictly domestic considerations.  
The international tax provisions at the center of the trade dispute are emblematic of 
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immensely complex international rules appended to a corporate tax system designed primarily 
with domestic activity in mind.   
Successful corporate tax reform requires the corporate income tax to be placed firmly 
in an international setting, which is not currently the case in the United States.  To be sure, the 
U.S. corporate income tax includes many provisions concerning the taxation of foreign 
income, but these provisions largely reflect attempts to apply the logic of domestic taxation to 
foreign circumstances.  As a consequence, the current U.S. corporate income tax includes 
foreign provisions that distort taxpayer behavior and impose significant burdens on 
international business activity, particularly given the greater mobility of international business 
activity.  This paper outlines a framework for considering the burden of this tax system. 
Assessing the burden of the current system is useful but does not provide guidance on 
how international considerations might be better incorporated into a reform of corporate 
taxation.  Incorporating realistic assumptions about the nature of multinational firm activity 
yields some novel analyses of what constitutes efficient systems.  These analyses imply that 
efficiency requires that foreign investment income face no residual tax upon repatriation.  
From the standpoint of countries (such as the United States) that employ a worldwide regime 
and impose residual repatriation taxes, a reduction in the tax burden on foreign income would 
not only improve national welfare but also improve world welfare.  Consequently, a 
movement to reform corporate taxation in the direction of exempting foreign income has a 
compelling logic.  Of course, the history of taxation in the United States and elsewhere offers 
many examples of persistent differences between what countries do and what they should do.  
Nonetheless, thinking clearly about the burden of the current system and the appropriate 
efficiency benchmarks provides the foundation for closing the gap between old rules and new 
realities.   
Section two of the paper reviews evidence of the rising importance of international 
business operations to corporate profits and corporate taxation.  Section three reviews the 
current U.S. rules governing the taxation of foreign income.  Section four evaluates the 
burden of current U.S. taxation of foreign income, noting that appropriate measurement of the 
current burden includes consideration of actions that are not taken due to the associated tax 
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costs.  Section five presents and evaluates standard guidelines for efficient taxation of foreign 
income, drawing attention to new concepts based on ownership considerations that increase 
the attractiveness of exempting foreign income from taxation.  Section six is the conclusion. 
II. The rising importance of foreign income 
The available evidence points to the likely importance of international provisions to 
the U.S. corporate tax system.  Figure 1 plots the ratio of receipts of profits from the rest of 
the world to total corporate profits, for American firms, from 1948 to 2003.1  The figure is 
striking in several respects.  First, the period prior to 1963, during which most U.S. 
international tax provisions were adopted, was characterized by a peripheral role for foreign 
profits.  Second, the two oil-price shocks of the 1970s led to temporary sharp jumps in the 
ratio of foreign to domestic profits, against a background of what was otherwise a steady 
rising trend through the late 1990s.  Third, the years since 1998 have witnessed a sharp 
acceleration in the ratio of foreign profits to total corporate profits, a figure that now has 
reached twenty five percent.   
This figure likely understates the truly global nature of U.S. firms today.  Figure 1 
employs measures of foreign profits on an after-tax basis and domestic profits on a pre-tax 
basis, so foreign profits likely represent closer to forty percent of the relevant total earnings of 
American corporations.  Additionally, U.S. exports and imports have grown in magnitude and 
importance to the U.S. economy, rising fractions of business activity in the United States are 
undertaken by foreign-owned firms, technologies developed in the United States are exploited 
abroad to increasing degrees, and a host of other developments illustrate the rising importance 
of international transactions with important tax implications.  If it was ever appropriate to 
design corporate tax policy as if corporations were domestic entities with minor sources of 
foreign income, it is now transparently imprudent to do so. 
One of the critical decisions facing multinational firms is whether to reinvest foreign 
earnings abroad, or repatriate those earnings as dividends paid to parent companies.  Figure 2 
provides a profile of payout ratios – the share of current earnings that are repatriated to parent 
                                                          
1 The data depicted in Figure 1 are drawn from Tables 6.16B, 6.16C and 6.16D of the NIPA tables which are 
available at www.bea.gov.  The figure plots the ratio of "receipts from the rest of the world" to "corporate profits." 
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companies in the United States – on an annual basis from 1982 to 1998 and a quarterly basis 
from 1999 to 2002.2  While this ratio has declined slowly over time, there have been recent 
sharp changes, particularly in the last several quarters.  Several factors might explain this 
pattern.  First, if repatriation amounts are sticky and foreign profitability has increased, this 
could result in falling ratios.  Second, if firms anticipate even more pronounced foreign 
income and investment growth, their willingness to repatriate profits declines and would be 
reflected in declining ratios.  Third, over the last two years, a repatriation tax holiday has been 
featured in various legislative proposals, and the recent sharp decline could simply reflect 
anticipation of the possibility of such a holiday.  Each of these alternative explanations speaks 
either to the growing importance of foreign operations or to the growing sophistication of 
firms in managing the complexity of international tax provisions.   
There is considerable evidence that foreign tax considerations influence the changing 
profitability of American firms and tax collections by the U.S. government.  Figure 3 traces 
the ratio of aggregate foreign tax credits claimed against U.S. tax liabilities to total corporate 
income subject to tax from 1973 to 2000, using data published in the Statistics of Income.3  
The downward slope of the ratio depicted in the figure might be interpreted as suggesting the 
declining importance of international income or international tax provisions to U.S. firms.  In 
combination with the data appearing in Figure 1, however, such an explanation seems 
unwarranted.  Rather, the modest and steady decline in the importance of foreign tax credits 
more likely reflects foreign tax reductions and the sophistication with which firms repatriate 
income to the United States.  As foreign income has grown in importance, the return to 
careful tax planning has likewise grown, so it is not surprising that taxpayers have responded 
with greater efforts to avoid foreign and U.S. taxes.  Hence the available evidence suggests 
that, both in magnitude and in character, foreign income, and its taxation by foreign countries 
and the United States, continue to grow in importance over time. 
                                                          
2 The data depicted in Figure 2 are drawn from Tables 6a and 6b of the U.S. International Transactions Account 
Data, which are available at www.bea.gov.  This figure plots the ratio of "distributed earnings" to "total earnings" 
from U.S. Direct Investment Abroad as provided in these tables. 
3 These data are reported in various issues of the Statistics of Income publication Corporate Income Tax Returns.  
This figure plots the ratio of foreign tax credits to income subject to tax. 
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III.   How does the United States tax foreign income?4 
The taxation of international transactions differs from the taxation of domestic economic 
activity primarily due to the complications that stem from the taxation of the same income by 
multiple governments.  In the absence of double tax relief, the implications of multiple taxation 
are potentially quite severe, since national tax rates are high enough to eliminate, or at least 
greatly discourage, most international business activity if applied two or more times to the same 
income. 
Almost all countries tax income generated by economic activity that takes place within 
their borders.  In addition, many countries – including the United States – tax the foreign 
incomes of their residents.  In order to prevent double taxation of the foreign income of 
Americans, U.S. law permits taxpayers to claim foreign tax credits for income taxes (and related 
taxes) paid to foreign governments.5  These foreign tax credits are used to offset U.S. tax 
liabilities that would otherwise be due on foreign-source income.  The U.S. corporate tax rate is 
currently 35 percent, so an American corporation that earns $100 in a foreign country with a 10 
percent tax rate pays taxes of $10 to the foreign government and $25 to the U.S. government, 
since its U.S. corporate tax liability of $35 (35 percent of $100) is reduced to $25 by the foreign 
tax credit of $10. 
Americans are permitted to defer any U.S. tax liabilities on certain unrepatriated foreign 
profits until they receive such profits in the form of dividends.6  This deferral is available only 
on the active business profits of American-owned foreign affiliates that are separately 
incorporated as subsidiaries in foreign countries.  The profits of unincorporated foreign 
businesses, such as those of American-owned branch banks in other countries, are taxed 
immediately by the United States. 
To illustrate deferral, consider the case of a subsidiary of an American company that 
earns $500 in a foreign country with a 20 percent tax rate.  This subsidiary pays taxes of $100 to 
                                                          
4 This description of U.S. taxation of foreign income is drawn from Desai, Foley and Hines (2003). 
5 The United States is not alone in taxing the worldwide income of its residents while permitting them to claim 
foreign tax credits.  Other countries with such systems include Greece, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom.  
Under U.S. law, taxpayers may claim foreign tax credits for taxes paid by foreign firms of which they own at least 
10 percent, and only those taxes that qualify as income taxes are creditable. 
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the foreign country (20 percent of $500), and might remit $100 in dividends to its parent U.S. 
company, using the remaining $300 ($500 - $100 of taxes - $100 of dividends) to reinvest in its 
own, foreign, operations.  The American parent firm must then pay U.S. taxes on the $100 of 
dividends it receives (and is eligible to claim a foreign tax credit for the foreign income taxes its 
subsidiary paid on the $100).7  But the American firm is not required to pay U.S. taxes on any 
part of the $300 that the subsidiary earns abroad and does not remit to its parent company.  If, 
however, the subsidiary were to pay a dividend of $300 the following year, the firm would then 
be required to pay U.S. tax (after proper allowance for foreign tax credits) on that amount. 
U.S. tax law contains provisions designed to prevent American firms from delaying the 
repatriation of lightly-taxed foreign earnings.  These tax provisions apply to controlled foreign 
corporations, which are foreign corporations owned at least 50 percent by American individuals 
or corporations who hold stakes of at least 10 percent each.  Under the Subpart F provisions of 
U.S. law, some foreign income of controlled foreign corporations is “deemed distributed,” and 
therefore immediately taxable by the United States, even if not repatriated as dividend payments 
to American parent firms.8 
Since the foreign tax credit is intended to alleviate international double taxation, and not 
to reduce U.S. tax liabilities on profits earned within the United States, the foreign tax credit is 
limited to U.S. tax liability on foreign-source income.  For example, an American firm with 
$200 of foreign income that faces a U.S. tax rate of 35 percent has a foreign tax credit limit of 
$70 (35 percent of $200).  If the firm pays foreign income taxes of less than $70, then the firm 
would be entitled to claim foreign tax credits for all of its foreign taxes paid.  If, however, the 
firm pays $90 of foreign taxes, then it would be permitted to claim no more than $70 of foreign 
tax credits. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
6 Deferral of home-country taxation of the unrepatriated profits of foreign subsidiaries is a common feature of 
systems that tax foreign incomes.  Other countries that permit this kind of deferral include Canada, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Japan, Norway, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. 
7 In this example, the parent firm is eligible to claim a foreign tax credit of $25, representing the product of foreign 
taxes paid by its subsidiary and the subsidiary's ratio of dividends to after-tax profits [$100 x ($100/$400) = $25]. 
8 Subpart F income consists of income from passive investments (such as interest and dividends received from 
investments in securities), foreign base company income (that arises from using a foreign affiliate as a conduit for 
certain types of international transactions), income that is invested in United States property, money used offshore 
to insure risks in the United States, and money used to pay bribes to foreign government officials.  American firms 
with foreign subsidiaries that earn profits through most types of active business operations, and that subsequently 
reinvest those profits in active lines of business, are not subject to the Subpart F rules, and are therefore able to 
defer U.S. tax liability on their foreign profits until they choose to remit dividends at a later date. 
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Taxpayers whose foreign tax payments exceed the foreign tax credit limit are said to 
have “excess foreign tax credits;” the excess foreign tax credits represent the portion of their 
foreign tax payments that exceed the U.S. tax liabilities generated by their foreign incomes.  
Taxpayers whose foreign tax payments are smaller than their foreign tax credit limits are said to 
have “deficit foreign tax credits.”  American law permits taxpayers to use excess foreign tax 
credits in one year to reduce their U.S. tax obligations on foreign source income in either of the 
two previous years or in any of the following five years. 
In practice, the calculation of the foreign tax credit limit entails certain additional 
complications, notable among which is that total worldwide foreign income is used to 
calculate the foreign tax credit limit.  This method of calculating the foreign tax credit limit is 
known as “worldwide averaging.”  A taxpayer has excess foreign tax credits if the sum of 
worldwide foreign income tax payments exceeds this limit.  Worldwide (foreign) income 
includes not only branch income and the repatriated earnings of foreign subsidiaries, but also 
most foreign source interest income, royalties received from abroad, and half of the income 
earned on certain exports from the United States.9  Because these sources of income are 
considered to have foreign source, firms with ample foreign interest, royalty, and export 
income have higher foreign tax credits as a result, and such firms, if they have excess foreign 
tax credits, are therefore effectively untaxed by the United States on these other sources of 
income.  Certain expenses, however, are deducted from foreign income in calculating the 
foreign tax credit limit; these deductible expenses include a portion of domestic interest, 
R&D, and general administrative overhead expenses, the concept being that a portion of such 
expenditures by multinational firms goes toward enhancing income produced by foreign 
operations.  Since these expenses are allocated between domestic and foreign source based on 
ratios of foreign to domestic income and assets, this system implicitly denies a fraction of the 
U.S. deduction for domestic expenditures undertaken by firms with excess foreign tax 
credits.10 
IV.   How burdensome is current U.S. taxation of foreign income? 
                                                          
9 See Desai and Hines (2001) for further elaboration of the design and impact of the rules determining the extent to 
which income earned on exports from the United States is considered to be foreign v. domestic income. 
10 For an analysis of the incentives created by the U.S. system of allocating deductions, and their effect on behavior, 
see Hines (1993) and Froot and Hines (1995). 
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 Estimating the economic burden of current U.S. taxation of foreign income is 
foundational to any analysis of corporate tax reform.  This section starts by presenting some 
basic results on the measurement of the tax burden in an idealized setting, followed by 
evaluating current and alternative estimates of the magnitude of this burden.  The available 
evidence suggests that, properly measured, the current U.S. tax regime imposes a significant 
burden on American firms earning foreign income.  
IV.A. The burden of home country taxation. 
The United States does not exempt foreign income from taxation, instead taxing it at 
the same rate as domestic income, while permitting taxpayers to claim credits for income 
taxes paid to foreign governments.  There are numerous complications associated with 
determining taxable foreign income and the credits that can be applied against associated tax 
liabilities.  While a complete assessment of the burden of U.S. taxation unavoidably requires 
delving into the fine details of U.S. tax law provisions and their effects, it is helpful to begin 
by considering the burden of home country taxation in a simplified foreign tax credit system. 
Consider a system in which the United States taxes all accrued foreign income at the 
U.S. corporate tax rate of 35 percent, and permits taxpayers to claim unlimited credits for 
foreign income taxes paid on this income.  With such rules in place, the effective rate of 
taxation of foreign business activity would be 35 percent, the same as for domestic U.S. 
business activities.  Firms investing in foreign countries with 20 percent tax rates would face 
additional 15 percent U.S. taxes on their foreign income while firms investing in foreign 
countries with 40 percent taxes would pay 40 percent to the foreign government and receive 5 
percent back from the U.S. government.  In the interest of further simplifying matters, we 
consider a case in which the United States is the only potential source of investment in a 
foreign country. 
The use of this stylized system of taxing foreign income would not only affect U.S. tax 
collections but also influence the behavior of taxpayers.  American firms investing in low-tax 
foreign countries would face higher tax rates on their investment income than they would if 
the United States did not tax foreign income.  As a result, firms would find it in their interest 
to invest less than under a system in which the United States exempted foreign income from 
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taxation, and conversely, American firms would invest more in high-tax countries than they 
would under exemption, since the system of foreign credits effectively taxes income earned 
there at lower than the local tax rate. 
As a further analytic simplification, it is convenient to consider the case in which taxes 
are imposed directly on capital invested, rather than on the returns to (income generated by) 
investment.  It is possible to plot the response of local investment to the total tax rate on 
income earned locally as depicted in Figure 4.  The area in this figure shaded with downward 
sloping lines is the tax revenue collected by the United States on income earned by 
investments in the foreign country, while the area shaded with upward sloping lines is tax 
revenue collected by the foreign country.  American investors invest in the foreign country an 
amount of capital equal to 1K , though in the absence of U.S. taxation the investment level 
would have been 2K .  The area below the investment demand schedule and above the foreign 
tax rate line between 1K  and 2K , shaded with horizontal lines, represents lost after-tax profit 
opportunities, much in the same way that the area below a consumer’s demand curve and 
above the marginal cost curve represents deadweight loss.  An accurate calculation of the 
burden of home country taxation is comprised of home taxes actually paid and the burden 
arising from the absence of what would otherwise have been profitable economic activity. 
The insight from this simple specification can be significantly generalized by 
considering the profit function.  Pretax profits earned by American firms in country i can be 
written ( )xτ,iπ  where ( )nττ ,...,1≡τ  is the vector of tax rates on income earned in countries 1 
through n, and ( )nxx ,...,1≡x  is the vector of other characteristics of these potential investment 
locations.  The tax vector τ  represents the combined effect of home and host country 
taxation.  If the home country exempts foreign income from taxation, then the relevant tax 
vector is ( )**1 ,..., nττ≡*τ , in which *jτ  is the tax rate in country j, while if the home country 
taxes foreign income while providing foreign tax credits, then the relevant tax vector is 
( )hh ττ ,...,≡hτ , in which hτ  is the home country tax rate. 
The burden (B) of home country taxation of foreign income takes the form of reducing 
after-tax profits, so the magnitude of this burden can be measured as: 
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Rearranging terms, this can be expressed as: 












* 1,,, τππττπ xτxτxτB h
*
h .   
The first summation in equation (2) is simply current home country tax collections, since it 
represents the product of current pretax profits and home country effective tax rates on 
foreign income (the difference between home and foreign tax rates).  The first term inside the 
second summation can be evaluated using the fundamental theorem of the calculus: 
























τττπ .   
in which z is the running variable corresponding to the combined burden of foreign and home 
country taxation of foreign profits.  The partial derivative on the right side of equation (3) is 
the derivative of the pretax profit function with respect to the vector of tax rates.  The 
properties of the profit function further guarantee that the integral in equation (3) can be 
evaluated in any order, since it is not path-dependent.11 
Evaluating the burden of home country taxation requires knowledge of the profits that 
firms would have earned along a sequence of given tax configurations.  In practice, the burden 
estimate presented in equation (3) can more easily be bounded.  A lower bound on the total 
burden of home country taxation is the tax revenue collected by the home country, or the first 
term in equation (3).  This figure provides a lower bound because the second term on the right 
side of equation (2), and therefore also the second term on the right side of equation (3), is 
nonnegative.  Taxpayers facing the tax vector *τ  do a better job of maximizing after-tax 
profits than they would if they instead allocated resources while thinking that they faced a tax 
                                                          
11 See Auerbach and Hines (2002) for a related analysis of the welfare evaluation of tax and other distortions. 
 11
vector hτ .  As a consequence, these second terms must be nonnegative, which follows from 
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An upper bound on the burden of home country taxes is the home country tax revenue 
that would have been collected if taxpayers behaved as though there were no home country 
taxes on foreign income, even though taxes were imposed at their usual rates.  This 
implication follows from transforming equation (2) to yield: 
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The first term on the right side of equation (4) is the tax revenue collected by the home 
country if behavior were determined by the foreign tax vector, *τ , instead of the actual tax 
rates, hτ , that investors face.  By a similar logic as above, behavior motivated by tax rate 
differences between foreign locations reduces pretax foreign profits in the interest of 
maximizing after-tax foreign profits. Accordingly, the second term on the right side of 











* ππ .  In the context of the earlier 
example, the upper bound is depicted as the sum of the areas shaded with vertical, horizontal 
and downward-sloping lines in Figure 4 as this combined area corresponds to home country 
tax revenue if investment were at the 2K  level.  If the relationship between investment and 
the total tax rate is roughly linear in this range, then it is possible to approximate the actual 
burden by the average of the lower and upper bound measures. 
IV. B. How large is the lower bound of the burden? 
The complexity of current income tax arrangements makes it difficult to determine 
U.S. tax collections on foreign income, let alone estimate what U.S. tax collections would 
have been if the behavior of American taxpayers had instead been unaffected by home 
country taxation.  A useful starting point for the first calculation is available, however, from 
aggregate statistics drawn from information reported on tax returns.  Raub (2003) reports that 
U.S. corporations claiming the foreign tax credit in 1999 reported $166 billion of foreign 
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source taxable income, against which they claimed $38 billion of foreign tax credits.  
Applying a 35 percent tax rate to this income, it follows that the associated U.S. tax liability 
on foreign income was $58 billion, against which firms could credit $38 billion in foreign tax 
credits, for a net $20 billion U.S. tax liability.  This $20 billion U.S. tax liability in turn 
represents 12 percent of the aggregate foreign income of $166 billion. 
The $20 billion figure comes from a comparison of existing U.S. law with an 
alternative that would entirely exempt foreign income from taxation, an alternative that 
would, for example, not require American firms to allocate domestic expenses, such as those 
for interest and R&D, against foreign source income.  The very simple calculation used to 
arrive at the $20 billion figure ignores many considerations that bear on actual corporate tax 
obligations, including the special circumstances of different taxpayers, the fact that some 
corporations have tax losses or can benefit from tax loss carryforwards, some are subject to 
the alternative minimum tax,12 not all firms face effective U.S. corporate tax rates of 35 
percent, and other considerations.  One of the most important omissions in this calculation is 
the ultimate U.S. tax liability that must be paid on foreign income that is earned but not 
contemporaneously repatriated.  Given the relatively low repatriation rates depicted in Figure 
2, and the well-documented tendency of American firms to repatriate more heavily taxed 
foreign income first,13 it follows that there is a considerable future U.S. tax liability associated 
with any year’s foreign profits.  Firms defer repatriation due to the associated tax benefits, but 
deferral need not greatly reduce the present value of associated home country tax liabilities in 
order to represent an optimal strategy on the part of taxpayers. 
In order to consider the degree to which average foreign tax rates on unrepatriated and 
repatriated profits might differ, it is useful to consider further available evidence from 
aggregate data.  Comisky (2003) indicates that, among the 7,500 largest controlled foreign 
corporations of American firms, profitable affiliates earned $171 billion of pretax earnings 
and profits in 1998, on which they paid $34 billion of foreign income taxes.  This corresponds 
                                                          
12 Firms with sufficient net operating loss carryforwards may not be subject to current U.S. taxation on foreign 
source income, but it would be a mistake to treat as zero the present value of the associated U.S. tax liabilities, since 
absorbing net operating loss carryforwards today means that they are unavailable for use in reducing tax burdens on 
domestic income in the future.  Similar considerations apply to other aspects of the corporate income tax; see, for 
example, Lyon and Silverstein (1995) for an analysis of the impact of the alternative minimum tax on the U.S. 
taxation of foreign income. 
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to a U.S.-definition average foreign tax rate of slightly under 20 percent, and therefore an 
ultimate U.S. tax liability of 15 percent,14 again taking the U.S. tax rate to be 35 percent.  
Since American firms repatriate less than half of their foreign profits as dividends each year, 
and the ultimate U.S. tax liability associated with an average dollar of the unrepatriated 
portion of foreign profits exceeds that associated with the average dollar of profits that are 
repatriated, it follows that the actual U.S. tax burden on foreign income exceeds the average 
rate calculated on the basis merely of income recognized in current tax calculations.  
Conservatively, the $20 billion estimate can be increased by 50 percent to $30 billion, to 
incorporate the effects of taxes owed on unrepatriated earnings and the differing average rates 
of taxation on repatriated and unrepatriated income.15 
This estimate of a lower bound stands in sharp contrast to prevailing estimates of the 
economic burden on multinational firms of the current system relative to an exemption 
system.  For example, Grubert and Mutti (GM) (2001) present the startling conclusion that 
exempting foreign income from taxation would increase U.S. tax collections by $7.7 billion a 
year, assuming that taxpayer behavior did not change with the tax regime shift.16  Observers 
such as Rangel and Buckley (2004) have mistakenly inferred from the GM calculation that the 
current U.S. tax system actually subsidizes foreign investment, which is not what the 
calculation says.  Instead, GM compares revenue collections under the current U.S. tax regime 
to an alternative with specified features that are selected as one possible realistic reform 
scenario, and that differs from the no-tax alternative that is the basis of the $20 billion figure 
derived above.  In order to estimate the burden of U.S. taxation of foreign income, it is 
necessary to consider an alternative that does not tax active foreign income and that leaves the 
taxation of domestic income unchanged.  Since GM is instead an effort to evaluate the 
consequences of a reform that would retain some of the current taxation of foreign income, 
and that would raise revenue by imposing greater taxes on some domestic activity, it is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
13 See, for example, the evidence reported by Desai, Foley and Hines (2001). 
14 This calculation assumes the impact of dividend withholding taxes to be very modest, given the very low rates at 
which they are applied; see Desai and Hines (1999) and Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) for consideration of this 
issue.  Recently released figures for 2000 suggest an average foreign tax rate that is slightly lower than 20%.   
15 This adjustment is also grounded in the estimates of the value of deferral in government budget forecasts.  
Notably, the U.S. tax expenditure budget lists the 2004 value of deferral as $10.03 billion (U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget, 2004, p. 290). 
16 For similar estimates of revenue consequences of changes to dividend exemption with alternative assumptions of 
allocation rules, see Table 1 of Grubert (2001). 
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inappropriate as a measure of the net burden on American businesses of the current taxation 
of foreign income. 
In order to serve as a measure of the current U.S. tax burden on foreign income, the 
GM calculation would need to be adjusted for its treatment of current taxation, as it omits 
some important current sources of U.S. tax revenue, and compares the existing U.S. system to 
one that would continue to tax some foreign income earned by American companies.  
Consequently, the GM calculation is not designed to estimate total U.S. tax collections on 
foreign income, and some significant adjustments would be necessary in order to use it for 
this purpose. 
One important adjustment concerns the unrepatriated income of foreign subsidiaries, 
which GM treats as though generating no U.S. tax revenue at all.  In the prevailing theory of 
corporate dividends alluded to by GM,17 the future dividend tax on repatriated current 
earnings is nonetheless fully an obligation of investors, and deferral does not reduce the 
present value of repatriation taxes on current income.  While such an assessment may ascribe 
too few benefits to deferral,18 the force of the analysis nonetheless implies that home country 
taxes impose significant burdens even on foreign income that is unrepatriated.  If anything, 
there is reason to expect, as GM note, and as discussed above, that the unrepatriated income 
of foreign subsidiaries will be subject to higher rates of U.S. taxation than is the currently 
repatriated income of foreign subsidiaries, as firms currently repatriate less income from low-
tax locations relative to high-tax locations. 
The GM estimate concerns a system that would exempt active foreign income from 
U.S. taxation, but that would tax all receipts of what is now foreign-source export, interest and 
royalty income, and would permit taxpayers to deduct only a prorated fraction of domestic 
(U.S.) interest, administrative and overhead expenses.  Such a proposed system imposes a 
significant cost on foreign investment, as noted by GM and by Altshuler and Grubert (2001), 
since any additional foreign investment, even if financed with borrowing from foreign banks, 
                                                          
17 This literature includes Auerbach (1979) and Bradford (1981), and its application to multinational firms, in 
Hartman (1985), Newlon (1987), Sinn (1993) and Hines (1994). 
18 Desai, Foley and Hines (2003) and Altshuler and Grubert (2003) note the possibility that American firms can 
defer U.S. taxation of foreign profits for extended periods of time by deploying accumulated profits in new foreign 
investments, and examine evidence of such behavior. 
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would reduce the interest deductions that the parent company could claim for borrowing used 
to finance domestic investments.  Furthermore, such a system raises considerable revenue by 
increasing the tax on domestic activities that produce exports and intangible assets that are 
exploited at home and abroad.  In interpreting this calculation it is important to recognize that 
the revenue effect of a tax reform that, in part, increases tax collections on domestic activity 
does not offer an accurate representation of the existing tax burden on foreign income. GM 
recognizes this, and instead addresses the issue of what revenue might be raised by adopting a 
practical alternative to an idealized tax system that would actually exempt dividends from 
taxation. 
The complications associated with such a method can be illustrated with respect to the 
treatment of export and royalty income.  Current U.S. tax law offers a favorable treatment of 
export income for firms with excess foreign tax credits from their foreign operations.  Should 
this be treated as a tax benefit for foreign business activity, as would be appropriate if the 
export sales were immutable and unaffected by their tax treatment, or should it be treated as a 
tax benefit for export activity, as would be appropriate if the excess foreign tax credits can be 
treated as given?  The reality is doubtless somewhere between these two extremes.  Taking 
the GM calculation to be a measure of the tax burden on foreign investment implicitly treats 
all of the tax benefit from the favorable treatment of export income as though it represents a 
tax subsidy for foreign investment, which is far too strong.  The same is true of the tax 
treatment of royalty income, which is the product of purposive domestic activity that 
generates copyrights, trademarks, patents, know-how, and other intangible assets.19 
 On the expense side, the tax system that GM considers is one that would permit 
American multinational firms to deduct only a portion of their domestic interest and general 
administrative overhead expenses.  The idea is that some portion of interest and 
administrative expenses incurred in the United States would be treated as though it produces 
tax-exempt income, so the expenses would not be deductible against U.S. taxable income.  
GM posit that interest expense would be allocated according to assets, so that a firm with 40 
percent of its assets in a foreign country and 60 percent of its assets in the United States, and 
                                                          
19 Raub (2003) provides a sense of the magnitudes involved, when he reports that, for 1999, American corporations 
declared $52 billion of foreign source rents, royalties and license fees. 
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total U.S. interest expenses of $10 million, would be permitted to deduct only $6 million of its 
interest expense against any U.S. taxable income.20  A similar method of expense allocation is 
currently used by the United States, though as GM notes, the method currently operates 
through the foreign tax credit limit calculation. 
Such a system implicitly taxes foreign income, since additional foreign investment 
reduces the tax benefits of deductions for existing U.S. administrative and interest expenses.  
It is noteworthy that this is true despite the fact that both foreign and domestic investments are 
financed with debt, and incur administrative expenses.  Thus, a U.S. multinational firm that 
invests half its capital in the United States and half in a foreign country with the same tax rate 
as the United States, and that has the same debt/equity ratio in the United States and the 
foreign country, and the same fraction of costs attributable to general administration in both 
places, would find itself in the GM scheme unable to deduct all of its interest and overhead 
costs, since the U.S. deductions would be reduced by half.  This type of outcome is partly 
responsible for the revenue raised by the reform that GM analyzes, but it reflects a significant 
tax burden on foreign investment.21 
 Adding together the components by which the GM calculation, which is intended for 
another purpose, understates the true current burden of U.S. taxation of foreign income entails 
more than doubling the apparent tax collection from foreign dividends, adding much of the 
tax benefit of current sourcing rules for exports, royalties, and interest, and eliminating 
expense allocation.  Without access to confidential tax return data it is impossible to make 
these and other adjustments to the GM figures, but the publicly available data present a very 
different picture of U.S. taxation of foreign income, one in which the foreign operations of 
American companies generate sizable tax obligations to the U.S. government. 
IV.C. Behavior if foreign income were exempt. 
                                                          
20 GM does not explain the method used to allocate general administrative expenses, though from the text it appears 
to be one related to a firm’s relative fractions of foreign and domestic income. 
21 Raub (2003) reports that American firms allocated $51 billion of interest expenses and $10 billion of R&D 
expenses against foreign income in 1999.  It is noteworthy that average burden calculations are likely to understate 
the U.S. tax burden on marginal foreign investments, since inframarginal investments have higher after-tax profit 
rates, and therefore typically face lower total tax burdens, including home country tax burdens.  The level of 
outbound investment is determined by burdens on marginal investments, so the exercise of calculating average 
burdens will understate the true effect of U.S. taxation on foreign investment. 
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 This estimate of annual U.S. tax collections from foreign investment – $30 billion – 
provides a lower bound on the burden of U.S. taxes on foreign investment income, and also 
provides the foundation for an upper bound of this burden.  Generating this upper bound 
requires the even more daring exercise of estimating what the behavior of American investors 
would be if the United States were to exempt foreign income altogether from taxation.22  
Some aspects of the behavioral responses of American investors are clear.  American firms 
would concentrate greater fractions of their foreign investment in low-tax countries, would 
undertake more aggressive actions to reduce foreign tax liabilities, would repatriate greater 
fractions of their foreign profits, particularly from low tax countries, would change their 
financing of foreign investment, would change the organizational form of their foreign 
operations, and would have more foreign investment in total.  It is possible to use existing 
estimates of the impact of taxation to obtain a rough sense of the size of the necessary 
adjustment. 
There is considerable evidence that foreign direct investment (FDI) by American firms 
is highly sensitive to its tax treatment by home and host governments.23  This evidence comes in 
two forms.  The first is time-series estimation of the responsiveness of FDI to annual variation 
in after-tax rates of return. Implicit in this estimation is a q-style investment model in which 
contemporaneous average after-tax rates of return serve as proxies for returns to marginal FDI.  
Studies of this type consistently report a positive correlation between levels of FDI and after-tax 
rates of return at industry and country levels.24  The implied elasticity of FDI with respect to 
after-tax returns is generally close to unity, which translates into a tax elasticity of investment of 
roughly -0.6.  The estimated elasticity is similar whether the investment in question is American 
direct investment abroad or FDI by foreigners in the United States. 
The primary limitation of aggregate time-series studies is that they are largely identified 
by yearly variation in taxes or profitability that may be correlated with important omitted 
variables.  As a result, it becomes very difficult to identify the effects of taxation separately 
                                                          
22 Such an exemption scheme would include removing the implicit taxation of foreign operations through domestic 
expense allocation rules.  The calculation assumes that the United States would continue to tax truly passive foreign 
income.  While the previous revenue calculations include current Subpart F income, much of this consists of 
foreign base company income and other income or activity that triggers Subpart F but is not truly passive in nature. 
23 See Hines (1997, 1999, 2004), from which some of this material is excerpted, for further elaboration and critical 
analysis of many of the studies surveyed in this section. 
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from the effects of other variables that are correlated with tax rates.  Exceptions include 
Slemrod (1990), who distinguishes FDI in the United States by the tax regime in the country of 
origin, and Swenson (1994), who distinguishes investment by industry. 
Other studies of investment location are exclusively cross-sectional in nature, 
exploiting the very large differences in corporate tax rates around the world to identify the 
effects of taxes on FDI.  Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) estimate the 
effect of national tax rates on the cross-sectional distribution of aggregate American-owned 
property, plant and equipment (PPE) in 1982.  Grubert and Mutti analyze the distribution of 
PPE in manufacturing affiliates in 33 countries, reporting a –0.1 elasticity with respect to 
local tax rates.  Hines and Rice consider the distribution of PPE in all affiliates in 73 
countries, reporting a much larger –1.0 elasticity of PPE ownership with respect to tax rates.  
Altshuler, Grubert and Newlon (2001) compare the tax sensitivity of aggregate PPE 
ownership in 58 countries in 1984 to that in 1992, reporting estimated tax elasticities that rise 
(in absolute value) from –1.5 in 1984 to –2.8 in 1992.  Altshuler and Grubert (2004) offer 
evidence of a -3.5 tax elasticity of investment in a sample of 58 countries in 2000, suggesting 
a continued, and possibly increasing, responsiveness to foreign tax differences.25 
In addition to influencing investment levels, the organizational form of foreign 
investment likewise appears to reflect incentives created by home and foreign taxation.  Desai 
and Hines (1999) and Desai, Foley and Hines (2004a) offer evidence that American firms 
significantly reduced their participation in international joint ventures after the U.S. Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 imposed significant tax penalties on income received from foreign joint 
ventures, and increased the value of international tax planning that is most readily undertaken 
using wholly-owned foreign affiliates.  There is also extensive evidence that American firms 
arrange the financing and other aspects of their foreign investments to avoid associated tax 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
24 See, for example, Hartman (1984), Boskin and Gale (1987), Newlon (1987), and Young (1988). 
25 Other cross sectional evidence is consistent with these findings.  Hines (2001) compares the distribution of 
Japanese and American FDI around the world, finding Japanese investment to be concentrated in countries with 
which Japan has “tax sparing” agreements that reduce home country taxation of foreign income; the estimated FDI 
impact of “tax sparing” is consistent with estimated large tax elasticities of foreign investment.  Hines (1996) 
compares the distributions of FDI within the United States of investors whose home governments grant foreign tax 
credits for federal and state income taxes with those whose home governments do not tax income earned in the 
United States.  One percent state tax rate differences in 1987 are associated with ten percent differences in amounts 
of manufacturing PPE owned by investors from countries with differing home-country taxation of foreign-source 
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liabilities.  It is noteworthy that this behavior takes place in the presence of existing 
significant home country taxation, since part of the effect of U.S. taxation is to diminish 
incentives to avoid foreign tax liabilities. 
It is often attractive to use debt to finance foreign affiliates in high-tax countries and to 
use equity to finance affiliates in low-tax countries, thereby accumulating income where tax 
rates are low and deductions where tax rates are high.26  The evidence is broadly consistent 
with these incentives.  Hines and Hubbard (1990) find that the average foreign tax rate paid 
by subsidiaries remitting nonzero interest to their American parent firms in 1984 exceeds the 
average foreign tax rate paid by subsidiaries with no interest payments, while the reverse 
pattern holds for dividend payments.  Grubert (1998) estimates separate equations for 
dividend, interest, and royalty payments by 3467 foreign subsidiaries to their parent American 
companies (and other members of controlled groups) in 1990, finding that high corporate tax 
rates in countries in which American subsidiaries are located are correlated with higher 
interest payments and lower dividend payout rates.  Desai, Foley and Hines (2004b) report 
that, within groups of affiliates controlled by the same American parents, debt levels are 
significantly higher among affiliates located in countries with higher tax rates.  Desai, Foley 
and Hines (2001, 2002a) consider the responsiveness of dividend repatriations to tax rate 
differences, finding that a variety of non-tax factors affect repatriation decisions, but that one 
percent lower repatriation tax rates are associated with one percent higher dividends – 
implying that repatriation taxes reduce aggregate dividend payouts by 12.8 percent. 
Contractual arrangements between related parties located in countries with different tax 
rates offer numerous possibilities for sophisticated tax avoidance.  Evidence of tax-motivated 
income reallocation comes in several forms. Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice 
(1994) analyze the aggregate reported profitabilities of U.S affiliates in different foreign 
locations in 1982.  Grubert and Mutti examine profit/equity and profit/sales ratios of U.S.-
owned manufacturing affiliates in 29 countries, while Hines and Rice regress the profitability of 
all U.S.-owned affiliates in 59 countries against capital and labor inputs and local productivities.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
income, and three percent differences in numbers of affiliates owned, implying a tax elasticity of investment equal 
to –0.6. 
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Grubert and Mutti report that high taxes reduce the reported after-tax profitability of local 
operations; Hines and Rice come to a similar conclusion, their data indicating that one percent 
tax rate differences are associated with 2.3 percent differences in pretax profitability.  While it is 
possible that high tax rates are correlated with other locational attributes that depress the 
profitability of foreign investment, competitive conditions typically imply that after-tax rates of 
return should be equal in the absence of tax-motivated income-shifting.  The fact that before-tax 
profitability is negatively correlated with local tax rates is strongly suggestive of active tax 
avoidance. 
Harris et al. (1993) report that the U.S. tax liabilities of American firms with tax haven 
affiliates are significantly lower than those of otherwise-similar American firms over the 1984-
1988 period, which may be indirect evidence of aggressive transfer-pricing by firms with tax 
haven affiliates.  Collins et al. (1998) analyze a pooled sample of U.S. multinationals over 
1984-1992, finding a similar pattern of greater reported foreign profitability (normalized by 
foreign sales) among firms facing foreign tax rates below the U.S. rate.  And Klassen et al. 
(1993) find that American multinationals report returns on equity in the United States that rose 
by 10 percent relative to reported equity returns in their foreign operations following the U.S. 
tax rate reduction in 1986. 
Patterns of reported profitability are consistent with other indicators of aggressive tax-
avoidance behavior, such as the foreign exploitation of intangible property developed in the 
United States, which produces foreign source royalty income and generates tax deductions in 
host countries.  Hines (1995) finds that royalty payments from foreign affiliates of American 
companies in 1989 exhibit a –0.4 elasticity with respect to the tax cost of paying royalties, and 
Grubert (1998) also reports significant effects of tax rates on royalty payments by American 
affiliates in 1990.  Clausing (2001) finds that reported trade patterns between American parent 
companies and their foreign affiliates, and those between foreign affiliates located in different 
countries, are consistent with transfer-pricing incentives.  Controlling for various affiliate 
characteristics, including their trade balances with unaffiliated foreigners, Clausing finds that 
ten percent higher local tax rates are associated with 4.4 percent higher parent company trade 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
26 Hines (1994) identifies exceptions to this rule that stem from the benefits of limiting equity finance in affiliates 
located in countries with very low tax rates in anticipation of reinvesting all of their after-tax profits over long 
periods. 
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surpluses with their local affiliates, which is suggestive of pricing practices that move taxable 
profits out of high-tax jurisdictions.  Swenson (2001) finds a similar pattern in the reported 
prices of goods imported into the United States, in which high unit tariff rates appear to be 
associated with unusually low prices. 
The upshot of a large body of research in the last 15 years is that the investment and 
tax avoidance behavior of American multinational firms is very sensitive to its tax 
environment.  There is some controversy over whether investment and tax avoidance have 
become more sensitive over time, or whether it was always highly sensitive but had not been 
properly measured in the past.  GM raises the possibility that repatriation taxes do not affect 
locations of foreign investment, which is interesting but inconsistent with the findings of most 
of the literature.27  GM offers evidence of the unimportance of repatriation taxes based on a 
comparison of American firms with excess foreign tax credits and those without excess 
foreign tax credits, which are unfortunately endogenous states and therefore inconclusive for 
identification purposes in cross sections such as theirs. 
As a theoretical matter, the Hartman and Sinn models are sometimes misunderstood to 
imply that home country taxes will not affect FDI levels.28  These models imply instead that 
the steady state capitalization of a single foreign subsidiary is not a function of home country 
repatriation taxes.  In the growth models of Newlon (1987), Sinn (1993), and Hines (1994), 
however, the present discounted value of foreign investment by a single subsidiary remains a 
function of repatriation taxes, since such taxes influence the time path of investment, and 
actual FDI data reflect present values rather than steady states.  More importantly, repatriation 
taxes influence the profitability of foreign investment in all of these models, and therefore 
affect decisions of where and how much to invest.  
IV.D. Implications for estimated tax burdens. 
                                                          
27 For example, the effect of repatriation taxes can be identified by considering the distribution of FDI in the United 
States from countries with differing home-country tax regimes, as in Hines (1996), or through analysis of the effects 
of “tax sparing” treaty provisions, as in Hines (2001).   
28 These models include Hartman (1985), Newlon (1987), Sinn (1991), Sinn (1993), Hines (1994), and 
Weichenreider (1996). 
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The available evidence implies that American firms would significantly restructure 
their foreign investments in the absence of U.S. taxation of foreign income.  This restructuring 
would likely happen on two margins: greater foreign investment and a restructuring of all 
activity in the direction of reducing foreign tax obligations and thereby improving after-
foreign-tax profitability.29  Taking current U.S. taxation of foreign income to constitute 
roughly 40 percent of the total tax burden on outbound investment, and applying a 
conservative unit elasticity of foreign direct investment, it follows that exempting foreign 
income from U.S. taxation would be associated with 40 percent greater outbound FDI.  
Hence, if the structure, location, and tax avoidance characteristics of U.S. outbound FDI were 
not to change in response, an upper bound on the burden of current U.S. tax rules would 
exceed current revenue collections by 40 percent. 
This 40 percent figure is only the starting point for determining an upper bound on 
current U.S. tax burdens.  The findings of a large body of research indicate that American 
investors made more sensitive to foreign tax rate differences by the exemption of foreign 
income from U.S. taxation would respond by restructuring their foreign operations to avoid 
foreign taxes.  Put differently, reduced U.S. taxation would have very large effects on 
differences between the attractiveness of earning profits in different foreign locations, and 
greatly improve the returns to avoiding foreign taxes.  In the interest of producing a 
conservative estimate, it is useful to assume that current U.S. taxation neutralizes roughly half 
of the benefit of earning profits in low-tax locations relative to high-tax foreign locations.  
Removal of U.S. taxation of foreign income would therefore at least double the relative 
attractiveness of low-tax foreign locations.   
In order to illustrate the magnitudes and mechanisms involved, suppose that the 
current taxation of foreign income reflects a combination of activities in countries with 35 
percent tax rates and countries with 15 percent tax rates.  Exempting foreign income from 
                                                          
29 The benefits of reducing foreign tax obligations would be most important for American firms without excess 
foreign tax credits under the current tax regime, since firms with persistent excess foreign tax credits already 
benefit significantly from reducing foreign taxes.  This emphasis on the distinction between firms with and 
without persistent excess foreign tax credits lies at the heart of the analysis in GM (2001), Grubert (2001) and 
Altshuler and Grubert (2001).  These papers offer evidence of limited differences in behavior between these two 
types of firms and, consequently, conclude that repatriation taxes have limited influence on foreign investment 
patterns.  This conclusion is inconsistent with the findings of other empirical work and with the implications of 
most FDI models, and may simply reflect the endogeneity of a firm’s foreign tax credit position. 
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taxation would encourage investors to respond to the 20 percent foreign tax rate difference 
between the countries.  For example, Hines and Rice (1994) report that one percent lower 
foreign tax rates are associated with 6.3 percent greater pretax incomes.  In this example, and 
under these assumptions, the elimination of U.S. taxes would result in reallocations in 
response to half of the 20 percent difference, and thereby stimulate 63 percent greater pretax 
income production in the low-tax countries than in the high-tax countries.  At the same time, 
foreign tax avoidance in all locations would increase in response to removal of home country 
taxation. 
While this example is merely illustrative, it indicates the magnitudes of reallocations 
of activity that could result from exempting foreign income from taxation.  Adding together 
the various channels of financial, organizational, and investment responses to exempting 
foreign income from taxation, it would be remarkable if significant relocation of after-tax 
income production did not accompany exemption along with increased tax avoidance for all 
foreign operations.  Avoidance of foreign taxes, either by relocating activity to low-tax 
locations or by undertaking actions to avoid foreign taxes in all locations, would, under 
current rules, generate greater U.S. tax liabilities by reducing the foreign tax credits that 
American firms can claim.  It is probably conservative to estimate that, for any given 
aggregate level of outbound U.S. FDI, tax avoidance responses to the removal of home 
country taxation would encourage activity that would have doubled home country tax 
collections if U.S. taxes had been applied. 
Adding the 100 percent figure corresponding to tax avoidance to the 40 percent 
estimate for greater total U.S. outbound investment produces an aggregate sum of 140 
percent.  It follows that an upper bound on the current burden of U.S. taxation of foreign 
income is 140 percent greater than current tax collections.  Putting aside the conservative 
nature of this calculation, an upper bound is unlikely to represent the true burden, and a better 
first-order (linear) approximation to the true burden is the average of the lower and upper 
bounds, or a total 70 percent greater than current revenue collections.  In the current U.S. 
context, and employing the figures provided above, this would correspond to a total burden 
equal to 20 percent of pretax foreign income, or roughly $50 billion on an annual basis.  Such 
an estimate of the magnitude of efficiency losses relative to revenue is well within the range 
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of comparable calculations for other aspects of the U.S. tax system.  Indeed, given the high 
responsiveness of U.S. multinationals to tax factors, a 1.7 ratio of efficiency losses to 
revenues seems modest.30     
V. Efficient taxation of foreign income31 
In order to evaluate the wisdom of current U.S. taxation of foreign income it is 
necessary to consider appropriate welfare standards.  While there is a timeless quality to the 
economic principles that form the basis of efficient tax policy design, the application of these 
principles to the taxation of foreign income has varied over time, and in particular, has 
undergone a significant recent change.  Until recently, three benchmarks were commonly used 
to evaluate the efficiency of international tax systems: capital export neutrality (CEN), national 
neutrality (NN) and capital import neutrality (CIN).   
CEN is the doctrine that the return to capital should be taxed at the same total rate 
regardless of investment location, with the idea that adherence to CEN promotes world welfare.  
A system of worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits satisfies CEN, since then 
foreign and domestic investments are all effectively subject to the same (home country) tax rate, 
and firms that maximize after-tax returns under such a system thereby also maximize pretax 
returns.  NN is the doctrine that foreign investment income should be subject to home country 
taxation with only a deduction for foreign taxes paid.  The idea behind NN is that home 
countries promote their own welfare by subjecting foreign income to double taxation, thereby 
discouraging all but the most productive foreign investments, and retaining investment capital 
for use at home.  Thirdly, CIN emphasizes that the return to capital should be taxed at the same 
total rate regardless of the residence of the investor.  Pure source-based taxation is consistent 
with CIN, as long as individual income tax rates are harmonized to ensure that the combined tax 
burden on saving and investment does not differ among investors residing in different countries. 
These traditional welfare benchmarks suffer from a number of shortcomings.  CIN 
offers little guidance for the design of a single country’s system of taxing foreign income, since 
                                                          
30 See Auerbach and Hines (2002) for a discussion of current estimates of such ratios for different aspects of the 
U.S. tax system.   
31 For a fuller discussion of the CON/NON framework, see Desai and Hines (2003).  This section draws on Desai 
(2004). 
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its application requires simultaneous consideration and coordination of corporate and personal 
taxes in all countries in the world.  While CEN and NN do not suffer from this shortcoming, 
they have other worrisome features.  Tax policies adopted by other countries matter not at all in 
determining whether a country’s tax system conforms to CEN, which seems an unlikely feature 
of a benchmark that is intended to characterize policies that promote global efficiency.  Tax 
policies that implement NN would subject foreign investment income to punishing home 
country taxation, thereby discouraging multinational business operations and, as a realistic 
matter, more likely reduce rather than advance home country welfare.  As an empirical matter, 
such policies have not been adopted by any major capital-exporting nation.  Moreover, a very 
common policy approach – exempting foreign income from taxation – is incongruent with any 
of these welfare benchmarks. 
CEN, NN, and CIN rely on the intuition that FDI represents the transfer of net savings 
between countries.  This characterization of FDI was discarded long ago by the scholarly 
community that studies multinational firms.  Instead, modern scholars view FDI as arising from 
differential capabilities, and consequently differential productivity, among firms, and the 
extension of intangible assets across borders.  This intuition squares well with empirical FDI 
patterns, which include the fact that most of the world’s FDI represents investment from one 
high-income country into another, and the fact that a very high fraction of such investment takes 
the form of acquiring existing businesses.  Consequently, most FDI represents transfers of 
control and ownership, and need not involve transfers of net savings.  This emphasis on 
transfers of ownership, and the productivity differences that drive ownership patterns, implies 
that CEN, NN, and CIN do not characterize optimal tax systems, whereas other welfare 
benchmarks do.  The modern view of FDI as arising from productivity differences among firms, 
with ownership changes taking the form of FDI, raises the possibility that greater outbound FDI 
need not be associated with reduced domestic investment.  Indeed, it is conceivable that greater 
outbound FDI is associated with greater domestic investment, either by home country firms 
undertaking the FDI or by unrelated foreign investors.  Under this view, in short, multinational 
firms are not engaged in the reallocation of the capital stock as much as they are engaged in the 
reallocation of ownership and control of existing capital stocks. 
 26
This emphasis on ownership suggests that tax policies should be evaluated on the basis 
of their effects on the allocation of ownership of productive assets.  Global efficiency is 
characterized by ownership arrangements that maximize total world output, whereas national 
welfare (taking the tax policies of other countries as given) is characterized by tax policies that 
maximize home country incomes.  This perspective yields the welfare benchmarks of capital 
ownership neutrality (CON) and national ownership neutrality (NON), in which CON is a direct 
analogue to CEN, and NON a direct analogue to NN.  CON requires that tax rules not distort 
ownership patterns, which is equivalent to ownership of an asset residing with the potential 
buyer who has the highest reservation price in the absence of tax differences.  As a practical 
matter, CON is satisfied by conformity among tax systems, including situations in which all 
countries exempt foreign income from taxation, and situations in which all countries tax foreign 
incomes while providing complete foreign tax credits.  The national welfare considerations that 
form the basis of NON suggest, much as is evident in practice, that countries should want to 
exempt foreign income from taxation.  This policy prescription stems from the observation that 
outbound foreign investment need not be accompanied by reduced domestic investment in a 
world of shifting ownership patterns.  As a result, countries have incentives to select tax rules 
that maximize the productivity of foreign and domestic investment, since doing so improves tax 
collections as well as private incomes.  When both capital stocks and ownership claims are 
affected by tax rules, then NON need not correspond exactly to maximizing national welfare, 
and home countries might benefit from imposing modest taxes on foreign investment. 
The CON/NON framework places productivity differences among multinational 
owners, and the transfers of control induced by tax rules, front and center in analyzing the 
efficiency of taxation.  The relevance of such a framework depends on the degree to which such 
differences matter relative to the actual transfers of net saving emphasized in the CEN/NN/CIN 
framework.  That scholars who study multinationals have dismissed the view of FDI as transfers 
of net savings as “neither satisfying theoretically nor confirmed empirically” suggests that 
employing welfare frameworks that rely exclusively on such notions is incomplete at best.32  
That incorporation of modern interpretations of FDI produces tax policies that countries actually 
use further suggests the importance of these alternative frameworks. 
                                                          
32 See Caves (1996). 
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The CON/NON paradigms carry direct implications for U.S. taxation of foreign income.  
The NON logic implies that the United States would improve its own welfare by exempting 
foreign income from taxation, rather than, as it does now, subjecting foreign income to taxation 
imposing significant burdens on American firms.  In addition, should it be relevant to American 
policy, CON implies that a reduction of U.S. taxation of foreign income would improve world 
welfare by moving U.S. taxation more in the direction of other countries that currently subject 
foreign income to little or no taxation. 
VI. Conclusion 
 Improving the taxation of foreign investment income requires abandoning the notion 
of international tax provisions as appendages to a domestic corporate tax.  At first glance it is 
perfectly logical to posit that, given that the U.S. tax system requires American companies to 
remit 35 percent of their taxable incomes to the U.S. government, the same type of taxation 
should apply to foreign income.  Unfortunately, the realities of a competitive world capital 
market suggest otherwise.  U.S. taxation of foreign income impairs the productivity of 
American firms in the global marketplace, and interestingly, impairs the productivity of 
investments located in the United States, since it distorts ownership patterns by foreign 
investors as well as Americans. 
It would appear that the current taxation of foreign income, a product of many 
complex appendages to the domestic corporate tax, imposes significant burdens on U.S. firms.  
The simple framework developed above suggests that the annual burden on American firms is 
conservatively estimated at $50 billion a year.  The current U.S. tax regime conforms neither 
to traditional efficiency benchmarks nor to more recent measures grounded in modern notions 
of multinational decision-making.  Ownership based concepts of efficiency imply that 
national and world welfare would be advanced by reducing U.S. taxation of foreign income, 
thereby permitting taxpayers and the country to benefit from greater market-based allocation 
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